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 It is a fairly recent development in both economics and the philosophy of science that 
there has been a dedicated and sustained discussion around the philosophical justifications for 
our approach to economics. This discussion aims to bring value to economics in two ways. The 
first way philosophical analysis of economics aims to bring value to economics is to make sense 
of underlying principles which are being relied on by economic programs, and show the 
relationship that these underlying principles have to claims economists make about the world. 
Oftentimes, the philosophical principles which play a justificatory role in the claims that 
economists make about the world are not themselves the subject of economic research. 
Disagreements between defenders of competing economic theories can sometimes stem from the 
result of differences in these less visible commitments. Thus, philosophy of economics can help 
make sense of disagreements between defenders of competing economic theories by filling this 
gap. The second way philosophy of economics aims to bring value to economics is to enable us 
not only to better understand the disagreements between economic theories based in competing 
philosophical principles, but actually weigh in on these disagreements to help decide which 
theory is better. 
 In this paper, I argue that philosophy of economics already provides us with tools for 
accomplishing our first aim quite effectively but suffers from a crucial shortcoming when trying 
to accomplish the second aim. In trying to accomplish this second aim, philosophy of economics 
is confronted with what I refer to as the direction of justification problem. In order to make 
prescriptive claims about which economic theory is based on better philosophical principles, 
philosophers must make some commitment about what economics ought to achieve and how best 
to achieve it. For the purposes of my paper, I refer to this necessary commitment as a philosophy 
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of economics. The direction of justification problem occurs when the prescriptions of a 
philosophy of economics contradict the actual practices of some economists and it is unclear 
whether said contradiction ought to serve as evidence against our philosophy of economics or as 
an indictment of the economists who violate it. I argue that thus far, philosophers of economics 
have not provided a principled solution to the direction of justification problem, and because of 
this, end up making opposing prescriptions about economics which stem from differences in 
intuition about how to answer this problem. In order to cross the gap from descriptive to 
prescriptive power, philosophers of economics must acknowledge this problem and confront it 
head on. 
 This paper is divided into four parts. In part one, I establish a set of conceptual tools 
which are instrumental in creating a descriptive analysis of the kinds of underlying philosophical 
principles relied on in economics and the relationships that these principles have to economic 
theories. This toolset is built both from drawing on work in the general philosophy of science 
which has not yet been applied in detail to economics, and extending this work using some 
original concepts. In part two, I first use the conceptual tools developed in part one to give a 
demonstration of analyzing a disagreement in economics which is at first difficult to make sense 
of but becomes clear once analyzed with our philosophical tools. Then, I show how this analysis 
falls short of giving us prescriptive power because of the direction of justification problem. In 
part three, I survey three views in the philosophy of economics which I argue diverge from one 
another due to differing intuitions about the direction of justification problem. In part four, I 
consider two strategies for answering the direction of justication problem which are insufficient 
on their own, but each provide important insights into how we can develop an answer. Finally, I 
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propose a framework for how to answer the direction of justification problem which draws from 
the insights of these two insufficient solutions. 
 
1. Building Our Conceptual Toolset 
In order to establish that there exists an underdetermination problem in deciding between 
philosophies of economics and the economic programs whose prescriptions they contradict, I 
want to first carefully explain what I mean by a philosophy of economics and an economic 
program. To do this, I will first present what I call metascientific commitments and the necessary 
role that these commitments play in science. Then, drawing on work from Larry Laudan, I will 
explicate the relationship between metascientific commitments and scientific practice using a 
three-part model of scientific rationality. This three-part model was originally created as a way 
of understanding science in general but has not yet been applied in detail to economics. To 
demonstrate that this model is in fact a fruitful tool for understanding economics, I apply the 
three-part model to notable examples in economics throughout part one. Finally, I will then 
define exactly what I mean by a philosophy of economics and an economic program in terms of 
the concepts I lay out beforehand. With this conceptual toolset in hand, I can then begin to 
demonstrate the explanatory value of philosophy to economics and articulate the problem which 
prevents us from making prescriptions about economic programs. 
 
1.1 Metascientific Commitments 
Broadly speaking, philosophers of science seem to agree that in order to generate and 
justify scientific theories, scientists must rely on a set of background commitments which govern 
the rules of scientific inquiry. The exact nature of these background commitments and the extent 
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to which they influence the objectivity of scientific theories is certainly up for debate, but every 
philosopher of science must recognize that there are some commitments which play a role in 
science which are not themselves typically the subject of scientific study. After all, what value 
does the philosopher of science bring to science if not the study of principles which scientists 
themselves do not usually study but nevertheless play a role in science?1 Typically, the role that 
background commitments play in science is to prescribe certain norms of scientific practice so 
that scientists are able to sufficiently generate, justify, and rationally endorse scientific theories. 
Some examples of these commitments are as follows: 
1. Scientific theories ought to entail testable predictions. 
2. If two theories explain the same phenomena equally well, then pick the one which posits 
fewer unobservable entities (Ockham’s Razor). 
3. The justification for a scientific theory should be objective, rather than relative to 
particular agents who choose to endorse it. 
I do not mean to claim that every practicing scientist endorses these three claims in particular, 
but rather that all practicing scientists rely on some set of background commitments which entail 
a general rule set for how scientists are to generate scientific theories and determine which 
scientific theories they ought to endorse. These commitments may conceivably be different 
depending on the scientific discipline in question, but all scientific disciplines have in common 
the fact that they require a commitment to some set of background principles which entail or 
constitute the norms of scientific practice. 
 
1 One might argue that philosophy of science brings no value to science, it only helps non-scientists better 
understand what scientists already understand. This view would be consistent with the belief that there are no 
background commitments in science that scientists themselves aren’t already studying or haven’t already taken care 
of, but I suspect that this is not an understanding of the role of philosophy of science that many would find adequate. 
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Because these commitments, which I will broadly refer to as metascientific commitments, 
typically fall outside the domain of the work with which a scientist is directly engaged, scientists 
usually commit themselves to a set of metascientific commitments implicitly when they choose 
to engage in certain scientific practices and endorse certain theories among multiple possible 
contenders. While some scientists who are interested in methodological research might take the 
time to explicitly formulate and follow a set of metascientific commitments, these commitments 
are typically committed to implicitly when scientists make the choice of doing science a certain 
way. Because the role of these commitments often go unrecognized, it has largely been the 
interest of philosophers of science to examine these metascientific commitments, to identify 
them where they may be relied on implicitly, to categorize them and determine the 
interrelationships that these commitments hold with one another, and most importantly, to 
determine the degree to which scientists are justified in holding particular commitments.2 
There are two other things to say about metascientific commitments for the sake of 
clarity. First, the reason I am using the terms “commitment” and “endorsement” rather than using 
belief language is because there are likely many cognitive attitudes besides belief that a scientist 
could hold in relation to a metascientific commitment or a scientific theory.3 A scientist might, 
for example, say that she never believes a metascientific commitment to be true. Instead she 
might hold a particular commitment to be most plausible among all contenders, or most useful 
 
2 It is difficult to know just how important discourse about metascientific commitments matters to scientists 
themselves qua scientist. Some may passionately defend the stance that scientists must be acutely aware of all the 
underlying principles on which they rely in order to be truly justified in their scientific pursuits. Others will instead 
argue that because metascientific commitments rarely play an explicit role in scientific discourse, it’s best to let 
scientists focus on what they do best. It is not my intention to settle this debate in this paper, but I submit that at the 
very least, if a scientist need not have knowledge of her metascientific commitments qua scientist, it would at least 
benefit her qua general critical thinker to have a more holistic understanding of her scientific practices. Furthermore, 
it benefits the non-scientist public to better understand what principles they are committing to when they endorse a 
particular scientific theory or field of research. 
3 Other possible cognitive attitudes might include relying on (Alonso 163-164), accepting, or acting according to 
the assumption that X. 
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for the purpose of achieving some scientific goal, like the goal of producing predictively accurate 
theories. For example, scientists often hold the metascientific commitment that we ought to form 
our theories according to the assumption that the world follows deterministic causal laws. 
Research in quantum physics suggests that this deterministic view is, strictly speaking, false. 
Nevertheless, above a certain scale it is perfectly sensible to act on the assumption that the world 
is deterministic for the purposes of achieving some scientific goal.  
Likewise, a scientist might endorse a scientific theory despite not, strictly speaking, 
believing it to be making true claims. Consider the case of a scientific anti-realist who endorses 
atomic theory despite having serious doubts about the possibility of having any knowledge of the 
ontological status of atoms. This scientist may accept atomic theory because it is the best theory 
for achieving her scientific goals despite not believing that atoms exist. Thus, to hold a 
background commitment and to endorse a scientific theory merely entails that a scientist is 
choosing said commitments and theories to be the best among all available choices according to 
whatever standard that scientist uses to judge the merit of a commitment or theory. Typically, 
this standard of scientific merit is based on the desire to achieve some scientific goal. However, I 
will have to return later to exactly what I mean by “scientific goal” once I have established some 
more conceptual architecture. 
Secondly, not all of a scientist’s background commitments are metascientific 
commitments on my definition of the term. A scientist’s background commitment is only a 
metascientific commitment if it plays some role in the scientific justification of the theories or 
scientific practices being promoted. A scientist who holds, for example, claim (1) discussed 
earlier is going to justify her endorsement of a scientific claim at least partially in virtue of its 
consistency with the prescriptions of claim (1). That is to say that she will treat the testability of 
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a scientific theory as a necessary condition for that theory’s status as a scientifically justified 
claim. In contrast to this, a scientist who holds the commitment that a scientist ought to be kind 
to her colleagues might still feel that this is an important condition for producing good science. A 
scientist who is unkind might be difficult to work with thus making it difficult to produce good 
results. However, whether a scientist was kind to her colleagues in the lab will not ultimately 
play any role in the scientific justification of any theories or practices which are being endorsed 
by this scientist. Likewise, ethical considerations, like a prohibition on human experimentation, 
might be a condition for “good science” in a moral or humanistic sense. But whether human 
experimentation was conducted in producing a scientific theory will not play a role in whether 
that theory or the practices which led to the development of that theory have scientific merit. 
 
1.2 The Three-Part Model of Scientific Rationality 
 I have tried to suggest thus far that there is a special set of commitments which play a 
justificatory role in any scientific claim, which I call metascientific commitments. Metascientific 
commitments are unique in that they play a justificatory role in scientific claims despite not 
typically being the object of scientific inquiry themselves. I do not think that this claim is 
controversial amongst philosophers of science. Larry Laudan, in his historical work on the 
philosophy of science, has tried to document the ways that philosophers have tried to make sense 
of these commitments in science. Laudan’s work has dealt extensively with identifying the 
nature of different kinds of metascientific commitments, and I will draw from this work in order 
to better identify how these commitments come to influence scientific discourse while extending 
Laudan’s insights into the domain of economics. 
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  In Laudan’s work on explicating the history of the debate surrounding the relationship 
between metascientific commitments and scientific theories, Laudan presents the hierarchical 
model of justification4 as the most widely known attempt at explaining this relationship. Due to 
its popularity in the history of the philosophy of science, the hierarchical model has largely set 
the terms for the debate around metascientific commitments (Science and Values 23). The 
hierarchical model posits that scientists hold commitments at three levels: the factual level, the 
methodological level, and the axiological level and posits a particular relationship among the 
three levels (Science and Values 27). According to the hierarchical model, factual commitments 
are generated and justified by appealing to methodological commitments which determine the 
rules for evaluating factual claims, and methodological commitments are generated and justified 
by their ability to achieve the scientific goals which are entailed by the axiological commitments. 
While the particular relationship that these three types of commitments hold with one 
another is controversial—Laudan himself argues that there are more interrelationships between 
these kinds of commitments than the hierarchical model acknowledges—the debate following 
the development of the hierarchical model has seemed to rather uncontroversially accept that 
whatever the relationship between these three types of commitments may be, this three-part 
distinction captures important features of the different types of commitments scientists hold. 
Thus, for example, while Thomas Kuhn rejects the view that methodological commitments could 
ever unambiguously pick out one set of factual claims or that axiological commitments could 
ever unambiguously pick out one methodology, he nevertheless accepts that scientists hold 
commitments of all three types.5 While Alexander Rosenberg argues for an additional conceptual 
 
4 Also referred to as the theory of instrumental rationality. 
5 When, for example, Kuhn argues that methodological rules always underdetermine theory choice, he is implicitly 
committing to the existence of methodological rules and their distinction from scientific theories (Science and 
Values 30-31). Likewise, when Kuhn argues that interparadigmatic conflict necessarily involves scientists coming to 
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distinction within the axiological level between proximate and ultimate axiological 
commitments, he still accepts the distinction between factual, methodological, and axiological 
commitments (Rosenberg 12-13). And while Laudan rejects the view that any of the three types 
of commitments is more fundamental than any other in terms of its justification, he nevertheless 
still accepts that scientists make commitments of each type and endorses the conceptual 
distinction among the three types of commitments. Laudan’s updated version of the hierarchical 
model, which he refers to as the reticulated model of scientific rationality, also makes the three-
part distinction but holds that no type of commitment is more foundational in its justification 
(Science and Values 63). 
Because the relationship between the three types of commitments is disputed, I refer to 
the model I am presenting as the three-part model of scientific rationality. The three-part model 
of scientific rationality is not committed to whether or not the types of commitments that 
scientists make are better suited to a foundationalist model of justification or a coherentist model. 
For the purposes of my argument, resolving the debate surrounding the exact relationship that 
these three levels of commitment hold with one another is not necessary. Instead, I merely claim 
that these types of commitments are conceptually distinct and that at the very least, the 
relationships that the hierarchical model posits between the types of commitments are among the 
relationships that these commitments hold with one another; I am not committed to the claim that 
the relationships posited by the hierarchical model are the only relationships that these 
commitments share. It may be that these types of commitments are related to one another in 
 
the table with different cognitive goals, he is committing to the existence of axiological commitments (Science and 
Values 47). For a more in-depth treatment of how Kuhn’s views fit with the distinctions posited by the hierarchical 
model, see chapters 2 and 3 of Laudan’s Science and Values (1984). 
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additional ways which make them more suited to a coherentist model than a foundationalist one.6 
But whether or not this is the case, simply by recognizing that there is a meaningful distinction 
between these three kinds of commitments, and that they hold at least the kinds of relationships 
to one another that the hierarchical model posits, we can begin to better understand some 
difficult problems in economics. Since these three types of commitments play an important role 
in my argument, and they have yet to be systematically applied to economics in a detailed 
manner, I will now explain each type of commitment individually and the role each plays in 
economic theories. 
 
1.2.1 Factual Commitments 
 Firstly, factual commitments are the commitments which are most transparent to a 
practicing scientist. Laudan defines factual commitments as “all manner of claims about what 
there is in the world, including claims about theoretical or unobservable entities,” (Science and 
Values 23).7 Factual commitments are distinguished from the other levels in the three-part model 
by their being about the world, rather than about scientific practice itself. While Laudan does not 
go on to define factual commitments more precisely, I think we can broadly distinguish them 
into two categories. Basic factual commitments are the basic building blocks which serve as a 
foundation for developing scientific theories. These commitments posit the fundamental objects 
which constitute the domain of phenomena being researched and lay out the rules by which these 
fundamental objects are able to causally interact. This conception of basic factual commitments 
 
6 For example, we might argue as Laudan does that while methods are judged according to whether they achieve the 
axiological commitments, axiological commitments can also be judged according to whether they can be achieved 
by our best available methods. (Science and Values 63). 
7 Factual claims are distinct from facts; whether it is a fact that nothing travels faster than the speed of light is 
dependent on the way the world is structured, whereas whether Newtonian physics holds this as a factual 
commitment is dependent on whether the theories posited by Newtonian physics assert this to be the case or rely on 
this commitment as part of their justification. 
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mostly coincides with what Laudan refers to in his earlier book, Progress and its Problems 
(1977), as a research tradition’s basic ontology (Progress and its Problems 79-80) although with 
one important distinction being that basic factual commitments need not necessarily entail 
ontological commitments.8 What I will call complex factual commitments are the most common 
objects of scientific research and debate. Complex factual commitments are the theories which 
purport to explain or predict phenomena in the world by reducing these phenomena down to the 
building blocks constituted by our basic factual commitments.9 
  Consider Richard D. Wolff and Stephen A. Resnick’s account of the basic building 
blocks of neoclassical economic theory as an example of basic and complex factual 
commitments in economics. Wolff and Resnick write: 
Neoclassical theory attaches basic importance to three economic acts that are 
attributed to all individuals: owning, buying, and selling. It assumes that all goods 
and services are privately owned by individuals and that all individuals seek to 
maximize their satisfaction from consuming goods and services. Neoclassical 
economists proceed to analyze what such rationally motivated individuals will do 
with their property as they maximize their satisfaction. (7) 
We can make sense of what Wolff and Resnick are up to here using our distinction between 
basic and complex factual commitments. According to Wolff and Resnick, the basic objects of 
neoclassical economic theory are individuals who try to maximize their utility according to their 
preferences. We might also add that they do so according to a well-ordered preference function 
 
8 One can conceivably, for example, be a strict scientific anti-realist and still believe that atomic theory entails the 
proper set of basic factual commitments for achieving the purposes of physics. 
9 We might also add to this division something like brute or trivial factual commitments. These would be factual 
commitments whose justification are so widely accepted that they do not play an interesting role in the scientific 
discourse. For example, the assumption that there is an external world might technically be required for a complete 
justification of a scientific claim, but it does not play any interesting role in scientific discourse. 
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with transitive preferences. The basic causal forces by which these entities interact is through 
buying and selling goods and services in the marketplace. This collection of basic objects and 
basic causal rules by which the objects can interact constitute a neoclassical economist’s basic 
factual commitments. An economist who then goes on to explain a particular phenomena or 
event by reducing it down to these basic commitments as much as possible—for example, 
explaining the wage rate in a particular region in terms of individuals and firms in labor markets 
with particular conditions—is engaged in developing complex factual commitments. 
 
1.2.2 Methodological Commitments 
Methodological commitments constitute the instrumental rules scientists follow when 
generating factual commitments, and the rules that determine which claims a scientist ought to 
endorse when faced with competing theories that posit distinct factual commitments (Science 
and Values 24). Theories are evaluated at least in part according to how well they maximize the 
features which methodological commitments tell us that a theory ought to have and their ability 
to minimize or avoid the features which methodological commitments identify as shortcomings 
in a theory. Methodological commitments are distinct from factual commitments because they 
are claims about scientific practice, rather than claims about the world. Thus, commitments like 
claim (1), which states that scientific claims ought to be testable, constitute methodological 
commitments because they give us prescriptive rules for whether a factual commitment ought to 
be accepted or rejected. 
Scientific programs will often, though not always, hold a different set of methodological 
commitments for justifying their basic factual commitments than the methodological 
commitments which govern their complex factual commitments. For example, consider 
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economist Lionel Robbins’s proposed account of economic methodology. On Robbins’s view, 
the basic propositions of economic theory are justified in virtue of their being deductions from 
universal truths of human experience with which we are immediately acquainted. Robbins 
writes: 
The scarcity of goods and services, which is the fundamental assumption of the 
system of deductive [economic] generalizations … is a known fact both of 
introspection and of observation…. And, on the basis of this knowledge, we may 
assert the applicability of the abstract deductions from the concept of scarcity to 
the actual condition of the world in which we live. Any suggestion that this is not 
so rests upon the most palpable failure to observe elementary facts. (96-97) 
Thus, Robbins lays out the methodological rules for generating and justifying the basic factual 
commitments of economic theory: we do so by deducing them from the indisputable truths about 
the relationships between desired ends and scarce means.  
Beyond these truths of which we are immediately acquainted, the methodological rules 
change. Robbins writes: 
...there is nothing in this conception of scarcity which warrants us in attaching it 
to any particular commodity. Our a priori deductions do not provide any 
justification for saying that caviare is an economic good and carrion a disutility. 
Still less do they inform us concerning the intensity of the demand for caviare or 
the demand to be rid of carrion. From the point of view of pure Economics [sic] 
these things are conditioned on the one side by individual valuations, and on the 
other by the technical facts of the given situation. (98) 
O’Brien 17 
 
Robbins is using the term a priori a bit loosely here, since he earlier claims that our basic 
commitments are known by “both introspection and observation.” It might be better to substitute 
“obvious” or “immediate” for a priori. However, the importance of this passage is that Robbins 
establishes a distinction between the methods for establishing the basic factual commitments of 
economics, and the methods for establishing its complex factual commitments. Once we aim to 
generate and justify claims about particular economic phenomena or events, we must look 
beyond our immediate intuitions about human behavior and account for the “technical facts” of a 
given situation. Thus, Robbins sets up different standards for first establishing the basic factual 
claims of an economic program before going on to develop methodological standards for 
creating complex factual claims about the economy. 
A methodological commitment can, though need not, be an epistemic claim. In the case 
of Robbins’s account of economic methodology, his justification for the principle of scarcity is 
an epistemic claim. Robbins is committed to the claim that we can have some legitimate 
knowledge which comes from introspection and reflection upon universal human experiences. 
An economic program which denied this would need some alternative claim about human 
knowledge to replace it. Terence Hutchinson, for example, who is committed to a positivist view 
of economics, argues that the basic postulates of economics which make claims about human 
behaviors need to be themselves empirically justified by experimental testing (Caldwell, Beyond 
Positivism 106-111). However, a methodological commitment need not be a direct claim about 
what kinds of propositions are knowable, but instead could be about what kinds of propositions 
are to be considered properly scientific. Hutchinson, for example, could conceivably admit that 
we can have knowledge about humans through reflection on our universal experiences, but argue 
that this knowledge is not precise or reliable enough to serve as a basis for an economic program. 
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Or that, even if it is reliable, its nature is such that it will not be as fruitful in building a 
foundation for generating a body of economic knowledge as a commitment to experimental 
verifiability. 
An example of a methodological commitment that does not make an epistemic claim 
would be neoclassical economists’ general commitment to the view that economic theories 
should be expressed mathematically. Austrian economists reject the view that claims about the 
economy which happen to be expressible mathematically are more epistemically valuable than 
claims about the economy which cannot be easily expressed mathematically.10 However, the 
neoclassical economist need not defend her commitment to expressing economic claims 
mathematically on the grounds that propositions which can be expressed mathematically 
constitute a superior kind of knowledge. Instead, the neoclassicist could respond with the claim 
that a methodological commitment to expressing economic claims mathematically has generally 
led to more fruitful research which can be more easily expanded and developed. It is not that 
mathematical economic claims are a higher form of knowledge, but that they are generally more 
useful when trying to build a body of economic theories and are thus preferable to claims which 
cannot be expressed mathematically. 
 
1.2.3 Axiological Commitments 
Methodological commitments, then, constitute the rules by which factual commitments 
can be generated and evaluated. But, if methodological commitments are not necessarily claims 
about what we can know, then what determines our methodological commitments? This is where 
 
10 See Scott Scheall’s “Slaves of the Defunct: The Epistemic Intractability of the Hayek-Keynes Debate” (2013) for 
an example of a disagreement between Austrian and neoclassical economics that is influenced in part by differences 
in the value each school of thought places on mathematical expressions of economic theory. 
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axiological commitments play their role in science. Axiological commitments are commitments 
about the cognitive aims or goals of science or of a particular scientific discipline (Science and 
Values 26-27). They tell us what it is our scientific pursuit is trying to achieve. On the traditional 
hierarchical view, methodological commitments are justified based on their ability to achieve the 
goals set out by our axiological commitments. Objectors to the traditional model like Laudan 
extend this to a two-way relationship, in which methodological commitments can be justified in 
virtue of their ability to achieve our goals at the axiological level, but our axiological 
commitments can also be justified in virtue of the possibility that they can be realized by our best 
methods (Science and Values 63). However, this more robust position still contains within it the 
original relationship posited by the hierarchical model and only adds an additional relationship to 
the picture. Thus, although the relationships between aims and methods might not be sufficiently 
explicated by the fact that aims are appealed to to justify methods, this is at least a necessary 
component of the relationship between axiological and methodological commitments.  
Axiological commitments are often posited as stances on the kinds of knowledge science 
should aim to produce. For example, Milton Friedman argues in his famous essay on economic 
methodology that the aim of positive economics “is to provide a system of generalizations that 
can be used to make correct predictions about the consequences of any change in 
circumstances,” (4). Friedman’s axiological commitment which drives his assessment of 
economic methodology is the claim that the primary aim of economics is to make correct 
predictions. Following the prescriptions of this axiological commitment, Friedman makes the 
methodological commitment that an economic theory’s “performance is to be judged by the 
precision, scope, and conformity with experience of the predictions it yields” (4). Thus, we can 
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begin to see how positing the aim of economics at the axiological level provides us with the 
standards of evaluation we can use to judge any proposed economic methodology.  
On Friedman’s view, economists’ commitments at the methodological level are to be 
judged by their ability to produce economic theories which are predictive, and it follows that one 
methodological approach to economics can be determined to be superior to another if it is able to 
generate theories which have greater predictive power. As a result of these commitments, 
Friedman is happy to endorse economic theories which we have no reason to believe are making 
true claims, as long as these claims entail accurate predictions. Thus, the common criticism that 
economic theories make ‘unrealistic assumptions’ (such as perfectly competitive markets or 
rational utility-maximizing agents) is rendered moot unless we have reason to believe that 
Friedman’s axiological position is wrong. 
An alternative to Friedman’s view can be found in the work of Ludwig von Mises, who 
held that the goal of economics was not to make true predictions but was instead to produce a 
body of synthetic a priori knowledge. Someone such as Ludwig von Mises, who proposes an 
alternative axiology, holds an alternative set of methodological commitments which includes the 
rule that we ought to reject an economic theory if it contradicts our synthetic a priori knowledge 
of human agency (Reflections Without Rules 41). Thus Mises, unlike Friedman, may reject an 
economic theory on the grounds that it makes ‘unrealistic assumptions’ because his axiology 
entails that economic theories ought to conform to our a priori beliefs about human action.11 It is 
not my intent to resolve this dispute—nor, as I will argue later, do I think we can do so without 
confronting the direction of justification problem—but I hope that an overview of this 
 
11 We might, as Alexander Rosenberg argues, say that Friedman and Mises are still united at a deeper level by the 
same ultimate axiological commitments: to produce knowledge. But this goal is itself too abstract to entail 
methodological rules and thus requires that we create proximate axiological commitments (Rosenberg 15). On this 
account, it is on the level of proximate axiological commitments where Mises and Friedman disagree. 
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disagreement helps establish the distinct role of axiological commitments and their role in 
shaping methodological commitments.  
 
1.3 Philosophies of Economics and Economic Programs 
 We are now ready to specify what it is I mean by philosophies of economics and 
economic programs as well as demonstrate how, with these concepts, we can point out a problem 
in the existing philosophy of economics literature. I use the term scientific program to refer to 
any actually practiced or once practiced tradition of scientific research which holds a general set 
of commitments at each of the three levels of scientific commitment, typically across generations 
of scientists. These commitments can be either explicit or implicit but are typically implicit at the 
axiologiological level and at least a portion of the methodological level. What makes a 
commitment partly constitutive of a scientific program is the role that this commitment plays in 
the justification of the theories and practices endorsed by said scientific program. Thus, what 
determines whether a commitment is part of a scientific program is solely whether said 
commitment is necessary for the justification of the theories endorsed by the program and the 
practices in which scientists in the program engage. It may be that scientists who generally 
practice within this scientific program claim to support other principles than those which play a 
role in the theories and practices of the program, but if this is the case it would not count as a part 
of the scientific program. Likewise, some commitments will be part of a scientific program 
despite scientists in the program not explicitly endorsing them because they nevertheless play a 
role in the justification of the theories and practices defended by the members of this scientific 
program. I use the term economic program to refer specifically to scientific programs which 
claim to be within the domain of economics. For example, on this definition, neoclassical 
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economics and Marxian economics constitute distinct economic programs because they hold 
different commitments on, in this case, all three levels of commitment. They differ on their 
commitments to what economics ought to aim for at the axiological level, what rules it ought to 
employ at the methodological level, and what factual commitments constitute our best economic 
theories.12 
There may be some ambiguity as to how different economists’ commitments at each level 
must be in order to distinguish them as working within distinct economic programs. Two 
economists need not agree on all of the same factual commitments to still be considered part of 
the same economic program. Two economists who hold generally the same commitments 
regarding the basic causal mechanisms which govern the economy, the proper methods for 
identifying these causal mechanisms, and the epistemic aims of economic research, but hold 
different views on, say, the degree to which primary education improves economic growth in 
developing nations, would still be considered within the same economic program on this 
definition.  
Nor do two economists need to disagree at every level of commitment to be considered 
working within different economic programs. For example, Mises and Friedman likely share 
many factual commitments, such as the law of diminishing marginal utility and the transitivity of 
preferences. However, Mises rejects the axiological view that the aim of economics is predictive 
accuracy and as such subscribes to a completely distinct set of methodological commitments. 
Despite some of their factual agreements, these two economists are generally considered part of 
distinct economic traditions and on this definition would be considered members of distinct 
 
12 For an explanation of where these two programs diverge at each level, see section 2. 
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economic programs.13 While we may not be able to identify the exact amount of divergence two 
economists’ commitments must have in order for them to be considered practicing in different 
economic programs, there are many unambiguous in which economists are either clearly within 
the same program or clearly in different programs.  
 What I call a theory of science is any explicit systematic view about what science ought 
to be committed to at all three levels of commitment. For example, Popperian falsificationism 
would constitute a theory of science on this view. Falsificationism explicitly contains claims 
about what science ought to look like at all three levels. It claims that the aim of science at the 
axiological level is to produce hypotheses with a high degree of empirical content which entail 
predictions that can survive genuine attempts at falsification. As such, it tells us that at the 
methodological level, the scientific merit of a theory should be determined based on whether it 
entails predictions which can, in principle, be falsified by empirical testing. Finally, 
falsificationism entails endorsements of some factual commitments over others based on their 
ability to meet the standards of the methodological commitments. A philosophy of economics is a 
particular kind of theory of science which is specifically concerned with what economics ought 
to be committed to at all three levels of commitment. Theories of science and philosophies of 
economics are distinguished from scientific and economic programs in that they are independent 
from what principles actually play a justificatory role in the theories and practices that 
economists defend. Economists practicing within an economic program may endorse a 
philosophy of economics which is not identical to the economic program within which they 
practice. For example, if in practice Friedman did not actually select which theories to endorse 
based on the standard of predictive power when he was doing economic research, but only 
 
13 That is, assuming that the principles Friedman and Mises implicitly commit to in virtue of the theories they 
endorse and the practices they engage in align with the views they explicitly promote.  
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promoted that we ought to do so when he was talking about economic research, then his 
philosophy of economics would not align with his economic program. 
 Using the conceptual tools of economic programs and philosophies of economics, we can 
begin to untangle debates in economics between different schools of thought which are otherwise 
difficult to make sense of. However, our ability to make prescriptions about which economic 
programs are better than others is complicated by an issue I call the direction of justification 
problem. The direction of justification problem occurs when our philosophy of economics 
contradicts our economic program, and it is unclear whether this contradiction ought to serve as 
evidence that our economic program is flawed for not following the prescriptions of our 
philosophy of economics, or as evidence that our philosophy of economics is flawed for not 
adequately accounting for our economic program. In the following part, I will demonstrate how 
our conceptual tools developed thus far can be useful in making sense of disagreements between 
rival economic camps which may otherwise be incommensurable. Then, I will show how the 
direction of justification problem arises when we try to advance beyond an explanatory analysis 
and make prescriptive claims about economics. 
 
2. Demonstrating the Uses and Limits of our Conceptual Tools 
2.1 Applying the Three-Part Model to Disputes in Economics 
When we account for the many levels at which economists form commitments, we can 
start to better explain some disagreements between economic programs which are otherwise 
perplexing. One kind of disagreement between economic programs which seems strange on its 
face occurs when different economic programs posit competing theories which appeal to 
different sets of basic facts, but neither program believes the other’s basic facts are untrue. Take, 
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for example, the competing basic models of the economy proposed by neoclassical economics 
and Marxian economics. Martin Hollis and Edward Nell, in their criticism of neoclassical 
economics, try to distinguish the basic neoclassical model of the economy and the basic Marxian 
model: 
The basic constituents of the neo-Classical [sic] vision are consumers and firms, 
whose optimising behaviour can be described with the aid of equations … The 
alternative [Marxian] vision, by contrast, begins by examining what neo-
Classicism takes for granted. It is concerned with structure, with dependencies 
between institutions, with what makes for continuance or disintegration. Its basic 
constituents are industries, sectors, processes and activities, defined in 
technological terms. The constituents do not normally coincide with the neo-
Classical ‘decision making’ agencies. (17-18) 
What is immediately perplexing about the disagreement between the basic models of the 
neoclassical and Marxian program is that neither is appealing to basic objects whose existence 
the other denies. The Marxian economist does not deny the existence of individual households 
and firms, nor does she deny that the behaviors of social groups are ultimately constituted by the 
behavior of individuals. Likewise, the neoclassical economist does not deny the existence of 
social groups like industries and sectors or the causal impact of technological processes on the 
economy. Nevertheless, the neoclassical economist does deny that these objects ought to make 
up the basic model of the economy, and the Marxian denies that the basic model of the economy 
should be reduced to the behaviors of individuals. 
If the only axiological commitment underlying economics were the claim that economic 
theories ought to make true claims—that is, if our only goal at the axiological level were truth—
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then the only reason we would have to reject an economic theory would be on the grounds that it 
relies on claims which are untrue. It is not until we account for the fact that there can be many 
different aims at the axiological level of an economic program, such as in Friedman’s case 
predictive accuracy, that we can start to make sense of this disagreement between the 
neoclassical and Marxian program. Because we now understand that the source of disagreement 
between competing theories could arise at any of the three levels, we can understand why the 
two programs hold different basic factual commitments. The source of the difference traces back 
to neoclassical economists’ general methodological commitment to methodological 
individualism in contrast to Marxian economists’ general commitment to methodological holism. 
Individualists hold that economic phenomena ought to ultimately be explained by appeal to 
individual behavior and the greater causal implications of these behaviors. Thus, a supply and 
demand model is logically deduced from the theories of the individual consumer and individual 
firm. Holists instead argue that economic theories can appeal to classes or groups and ought not 
to (or perhaps cannot) be reduced to an explanation that appeals to individual behavior, such as 
in the Marxian case, social classes, industries, and sectors. 
Disputes over methodological commitments, like that of the individualist and the holist, 
can be resolved in principle if the disputing parties hold the same axiological commitments. 
However, Hollis and Nell seem to deny the claim that neoclassicists and Marxians hold the same 
axiological commitments, writing that for neoclassical economics, “The object is to predict 
[optimizing] behaviour and its consequences, taking for granted the circumstances in which the 
behaviour occurs,” whereas for Marxian economics, “Instead the object is to arrive at a blueprint 
of the economic system which explains how the system responds to institutional changes. The 
blueprint is essentially an analysis of the nature of production and of the social relations 
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surrounding production” (16-17). With our conceptual tools from the three-part model, we can 
now see that Hollis and Nell’s analysis hinges on a distinction which goes deeper than a factual 
or methodological dispute to a disagreement at the axiological level about the purpose of 
economic theory. According to the neoclassicists, the aim of economics is to predict the 
consequences of individuals changing their behavior in response to some change in the economy, 
whereas for Marxians, the goal of economics is to analyze and understand the social relations 
between groups which form around modes of production and how these social relations evolve in 
response to changing material conditions. The ultimate root of the difference in basic factual 
commitments is thus driven by a difference in goals. This is made most clear when Hollis and 
Nell go on to write: 
… in order to conduct a comparative test [between the basic neoclassical and 
basic Marxian model], an umpire would have to decide whether the payment of 
profits (rent, interest, etc.) is an exchange. … He would have to decide whether 
there is a basic social division into producers and consumers or whether the key 
concepts are those of hierarchy and class. Observation will not settle the 
point...each vision can accommodate the findings of the other, by assigning them 
a subordinate role. Many neo-Classical models include ‘structural’ relationships 
and many Classical-Marxian models include behavioural functions. But there 
remains a difference in emphasis, whose correctness cannot be judged … without 




Thus, the disagreements between economists in the neoclassical program and the Marxian 
program are ultimately rooted in “rival visions” of the aims of economic theory, which are not 
themselves determinable by scientific testing. 
An account of economic programs using the hierarchical model allows us to better make 
sense of what is otherwise a fairly perplexing problem. We observe that neoclassicists and 
Marxians are engaged in separate economic programs and are producing distinct complex factual 
commitments. The distinction between these complex factual commitments results from the fact 
that economists in the two competing programs are explaining economic phenomena by reducing 
those phenomena down to their respective basic factual commitments, which also differ from one 
another. In order to settle this difference in basic factual commitments, we can appeal to 
methodological commitments. However, we see that neoclassical economists’ basic factual 
commitments are justified by their methodological commitment to methodological 
individualism, while Marxians’ basic factual commitments are justified by their commitment to 
methodological holism. These two methodological commitments are mutually exclusive as they 
entail mutually exclusive rules for generating basic factual commitments. Thus, we look to the 
axiological level to determine which methodological approach better achieves the cognitive 
goals of economics, but we find that the two economic programs are committed to different 
axiological principles. Neoclassical economics holds that the aim of economics is to generate 
theories which predict the consequences of certain events based on appeals to the ways in which 
individuals will change their behavior. Marxian economics holds that the aim of economics is to 
analyze how social relations between groups are formed around economic modes of production. 
Thus, with our three-part approach we can identify the source of the differences in neoclassicists’ 
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and Marxians’ factual claims by identifying how they arise from, at bottom, different axiological 
commitments. 
 
2.2 The Shortcoming of the Analysis 
 If the goal of philosophy of science were merely to explain and identify the source of 
disagreements between camps of scientists, then we would find ourselves with a sufficient, or at 
least highly effective toolset that is generated merely by our ability to conceptually organize the 
different commitments of economic schools of thought at distinct levels. This conceptual 
ordering is valuable in itself because it brings awareness to the ways in which disagreements 
between competing economic programs can be a result of deeper commitments which are not 
themselves typically the object of economic research. By understanding exactly what the 
economic programs we analyze are committing themselves to at each level, we can better 
understand why economic programs diverge from one another in their views and practices. 
However, philosophers of science typically want to go beyond this. Ideally, we would like, after 
explicating the distinct programs of neoclassical economics and Marxian economics, to identify 
which program is the better economic program. But what are we to appeal to in order to do this?  
One option for making a prescriptive judgment is to find agreement at some level and 
reason outwardly from there. For example, if two economic programs were committed to the 
same set of axiological commitments, we could in principle determine which program’s 
methodology better achieved the shared goals at the axiological level. However, on the 
traditional hierarchical version of the three-part model, it is not possible for us to do this when 
we reach a disagreement at the axiological level, as this is the most foundational level of 
justification for a scientific program. In order to surpass this problem, Laudan proposes his 
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coherentist version of the three-part model which I briefly discussed in part one. Because 
according to Laudan, axiological commitments are not any more foundational than the other 
levels of commitment, we could settle axiological differences by appealing to shared 
methodological commitments. If two programs had the same views about which methods are the 
best for doing economics, we could in principle determine which program’s axiological 
commitments are more realizable by our best methods. However, as we already saw, this 
difference at the axiological level between neoclassicists and Marxians is paired with a 
methodological disagreement, so we cannot hold fixed the methodological level of commitment 
as a shared standard for commensurability either.  
In the case of wholesale disagreements between competing economic programs at every 
level, we are left with two options: concede that we will not be able to make prescriptive claims 
about competing economic programs, or develop a principled view of what an economic 
program should be committed to at each level which is prior to the facts about what existing 
economic programs happen to commit themselves to. That is to say, if we are to make 
prescriptions about economic programs in cases like the one above between the neoclassicists 
and the Marxians, we need a philosophy of economics. But if a philosophy of economics is 
necessary for us to make judgments about economic programs, what are we going to judge our 
philosophy of economics against? If the standards set out by our philosophy of economics failed 
to conform with our most widely-cherished economic programs, would this serve as an 
indictment of our best economic programs, or a sign that we’ve erred in the development of our 
philosophy of economics? This is where the direction of justification problem arises: when our 
philosophy of economics contradicts a particular economic program, it is unclear whether this 
ought to serve as a sign that our philosophy of economics is mistaken, or that the economists 
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who have violated our philosophy of economics are mistaken. To see how this problem arises 
more acutely, let us turn to an example from the natural sciences. 
 
2.3 The Direction of Justification Problem in the Natural Sciences 
 To see where the direction of justification problem arises in the general philosophy of 
science, I want to first analyze a widely known theory of science, Karl Popper’s falsificationism. 
Recall from part one that Popper’s falsificationism offers a prescription for scientific programs at 
all three levels. It tells us that scientific programs ought to aim to produce theories with high 
levels of empirical content, that the method by which they should do this is by developing 
falsifiable theories and subjecting them to rigorous attempts at falsification, and that some 
existing theories, like Einstein’s theory of relativity, are the best exemplars of science because 
they meet these conditions. If Popper’s theory of science is correct, he has given philosophers of 
science a way to use their conceptual tools to, in principle, make prescriptions about scientific 
programs. The role of the falsificationist philosopher of science is, then, to identify the implicit 
commitments of an existing scientific program and judge the merit of this program based on 
whether these commitments are consistent with the prescriptions of falsificationism. If we held 
fixed that falsificationism was the correct philosophy of economics, then we could settle the 
dispute between neoclassicists and Marxians by determining which program is committed to the 
principles which are more aligned with the prescriptions of falsificationism. 
 Unfortunately, the philosopher of science’s job is not that simple. Many philosophers 
reject falsificationism and posit competing theories of science instead. One problem that prevents 
philosophers of science from agreeing on a theory of science is that when a theory of science 
contradicts the actual practices of a scientific program, it is unclear whether the theory of science 
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should serve as evidence against the viability of the scientific program, or whether the scientific 
program should serve as evidence that philosophers have an inaccurate theory of science. For 
example, one might hold that evolutionary biology is not a justified scientific program because it 
can’t live up to the goals of science entailed by falsificationism. Since evolutionary theories 
cannot easily be subject to an experimental test, it is hard to see how a theory of evolution could 
entail falsifiable predictions. Popper himself notoriously called evolutionary theory into question 
for its failure to produce falsifiable theories, although he would later recant this view (“Natural 
Selection” 343-349). However, one might just as sensibly hold the view that Popperian 
falsificationism is a poor theory of science because it fails to explain why evolutionary biology is 
a successful scientific program. Thus, it is unclear in this case whether Popper’s theory of 
science holds prescriptive power over the scientific program of evolutionary biology, or if the 
scientific program of evolutionary biology serves as evidence against Popper’s theory of science.  
This uncertainty about which of the two objects in question—the program of evolutionary theory 
and the falsificationist theory of science—should serve as evidence against the other is an 
example of the direction of justification problem. In order to see just how problematic this can be 
when left unaddressed, let’s take a closer look at how Popper tries to justify falsificationism as a 
comprehensive theory of science.  
In Conjectures and Refutations (1962), Popper explains the process by which he came to 
develop and justify his theory of falsificationism. Notably, he discusses pre-theoretical intuitions 
he had about science, which he used to develop his view. He writes that the theories which first 
interested him were Einstein’s theory of relativity, Marx’s theory of history, Freudian 
psychoanalysis, and Alfred Adler’s “individual psychology,” (Conjectures and Refutations 34). 
However, he quickly became disillusioned with the latter three of the four theories and this 
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disillusionment served as evidence in the development of falsificationism. He writes that in the 
beginning of developing his view, “My problem perhaps first took the simple form, ‘what is 
wrong with Marxism, psycho-analysis, and individual psychology? Why are they so different 
from physical theories, from Newton’s theory, and especially from the theory of relativity?’” 
(Conjectures and Refutations 34). Thus, in developing a theory of science, Popper begins by 
appealing to our intuitions about already existing scientific programs.  
Popper assumes that we have good pre-philosophical reasons for presuming that 
Einstein’s theory of relativity constitutes a good scientific program and the latter three theories 
constitute programs which are inferior to Einstein’s program in some way. From this initial 
intuition, Popper reasons that the best explanation for why Einstein’s theory is more scientific 
than the latter theories is that relativity entails falsifiable predictions while Marxism, 
psychoanalysis, and individual psychology do not. Popper draws from this that, at the axiological 
level, the aim of science is to produce bold falsifiable conjectures, the method for evaluating 
these bold conjectures is attempts at falsification, and finally that the factual commitments which 
we are left with after following the falsificationist method are therefore the best of our scientific 
claims. What’s notable about this method that Popper employs is that he is first appealing to our 
existing intuitions about scientific programs, and then using the distinctions between these 
already existing scientific programs as evidence for developing a theory of science. In this case, 
Popper seems to endorse the view that philosophers of science should be able to appeal to our 
beliefs about existing scientific programs as evidence for the plausibility of our theory of 
science. However, Popper also wants to use his theory of science as a prescriptive tool for 
evaluating existing scientific programs and determining their scientific status. 
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This methodology should strike us as prima facie suspect, as it carries with it a threat of 
circularity. If we evaluate the plausibility of a theory of science based on its ability to explain our 
beliefs about scientific programs, but we evaluate our beliefs about scientific programs based on 
their compliance with the prescriptions of our theory of science, we’ve caught ourselves in a 
circle. Thus, it cannot be the case that Popper thinks we can both justify falsificationism by its 
compliance with our beliefs about scientific programs and justify our beliefs about scientific 
programs based on its compliance with falsificationism. It would be uncharitable to assume 
Popper would catch himself in such an apparent trap. Instead, we might more charitably 
conclude that Popper thinks we can justify our beliefs about our theory of science based on its 
ability to explain some, but not all, of our beliefs about scientific programs. If we had a 
principled reason for determining in which cases our theory of science is to be judged against our 
beliefs about scientific programs, and in which cases our beliefs about scientific programs are to 
be judged against our theory of science, we could avoid the circular position of having the two 
mutually justify one another. But, how are we to determine which of these beliefs about 
scientific programs make it into this privileged class of beliefs which we use as evidence for our 
theory of science, and which of these beliefs about scientific programs should themselves be 
evaluated by our theory of science? We have escaped the problem of logical circularity only to 
end up in another problem: the problem of determining in which cases we can use our beliefs 
about scientific programs as evidence to inform our theory of science, and in which cases we can 
use our theory of science as evidence to inform our beliefs about scientific programs. Without a 
way of distinguishing these cases from one another, in any possible contradiction between a 
theory of science and a scientific program it will always be indeterminate as to which of the two 
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beliefs counts as evidence against the other. Thus, any comprehensive theory of science, or 
philosophy of economics, must have an answer to this problem if it wishes to be prescriptive. 
 
2.4 Is the Direction of Justification Problem a Live Problem? 
One immediate response to this problem is that it does not follow from the fact that two 
different conclusions are both logically possible that those two conclusions are equally plausible. 
It might be the case that the direction of justification problem only shows us that there are two 
different logically possible conclusions in the case of a contradiction between a theory of science 
and a scientific program, but not that this will actually pose a practical problem in making a 
decision between the two choices. There seem to be some cases in which this response to the 
direction of justification problem is sufficient. For example, consider the Duhem-Quine problem 
as a response to falsificationism. According to the Duhem-Quine problem, the falsificationist 
view that theories can only be scientific if they can be tested by attempts at deductively falsifying 
their entailments is untenable because, in practice, it is impossible to isolate a theory’s 
entailments such that they can be deductively falsified in a test. This is because all scientific 
theories are necessarily tested alongside a collection of auxiliary assumptions (Ladyman 77-80). 
If, for example, I am testing the claim that the speed of gravity on earth is 9.8 meters per second, 
I must make auxiliary assumptions to control for things like wind resistance or other 
interferences. Furthermore, I’ll have to assume that whatever tools I’m using to measure the 
speed of a falling object are calibrated properly, I’ll have to assume that I am reading the results 
correctly, as so forth. Thus, in practice, according to the Duhem-Quine problem, we could never 
isolate one entailment of a scientific theory such that it can be deductively falsified in an 
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experimental setting since we will always rely on induction to make inferences about auxiliary 
conditions.  
The logical structure of the Duhem-Quine problem as a response to falsificationism can 
be formalized in the following way: 
1. According to naive falsificationism, a theory is scientific only if it entails claims which 
can be deductively falsified in an experimental setting 
2. No theory entails a claim which can be deductively falsified in an experimental setting 
because all theories are tested in conjunction with auxiliary assumptions. 
3. Because (1) and (2), according to naive falsificationism, there are no scientific theories.  
This is obviously meant to be a reductio ad absurdum of naive falsificationism. The Duhem-
Quine problem is meant to bring our attention to the fact that a view of science which is 
committed to naive falsificationism is untenable because it entails claim (3), which is 
unacceptable. However, it is still logically possible for us to instead maintain our commitment to 
naive falsificationism, and simply accept claim (3). Of course, just because this conclusion is 
logically possible does not mean that it is plausible. No one would accept the conclusion that 
there are no scientific theories. Thus, we instead conclude that naive falsificationism must be 
rejected or amended as a theory of science in order to avoid the need to accept claim (3). 
From this analysis, we can say the following about the direction of justification problem: 
in cases in which a theory of science contradicts a scientific program, the direction of 
justification problem only poses a practical problem to our coming to an agreement on a 
conclusion when more than one of the possible conclusions is plausible to us. Therefore, if we 
analyze the philosophy of science and find that in all cases in which a contradiction is identified 
between a theory of science and a scientific program, all but one of the possible responses to this 
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contradiction are unacceptable in the way that claim (3) is unacceptable, then there should be no 
practical reason to be concerned about the direction of justification problem. However, as I will 
argue for in the following section, at least in the case of economics, there are substantial 
instances in which not only could reasonable agents form different conclusions in response to the 
contradiction between a philosophy of economics and an economic program, but that the 
philosophy of economics literature contains substantial instances in which it is actually the case 
that philosophers have formed opposite intuitions in these cases. Thus, at least in the case of 
economics, the direction of justification problem forms a practical and not just logical problem 
for the philosophy of economics. 
 
3 The Direction of Justification Problem in Economics 
While in the natural sciences, we may be able to avoid the direction of justification 
problem on the grounds that the correct position will be obvious to us when a scientific program 
contradicts a theory of science, this is not the case in economics. In fact, not only are multiple 
responses to the contradiction between philosophies of economics and economic programs 
plausible, the philosophy of economics literature contains examples of philosophers whose 
disagreement seems to arise from having opposite intuitions about this matter without realizing 
it. In this section, I will discuss three opposing views in the philosophy of economics literature 
which seem to diverge as a result of each party having different intuitions about the direction of 
justification problem. My hope is that once it is clear that the philosophy of economics has a 
cleavage due to philosophers having different implicit intuitions about the solution to this 
problem, it will become clear why establishing a solution to this problem is a necessary step in 




3.1 Hollis and Nell 
 Hollis and Nell offer their own view for how to solve this dispute between the 
neoclassical and Marxian economic programs using the tools of philosophy, which ultimately 
suffers because of their failure to recognize the role of the direction of justification problem. 
According to Hollis and Nell, “economic theories are to be judged partly by whether they are 
backed by a suitable scientific method which is itself backed by a sound theory of knowledge” 
(13). They hold that neoclassical economics is “backed by” a philosophy of science rooted in 
positivism, which they aim to show is unsound. In rejecting the positivist philosophy of science, 
Hollis and Nell aim to “leave neo-Classicists [sic] without any coherent methodology or criteria 
of scientific merit” (20). The main strategy for Hollis and Nell to settle the dispute between 
neoclassicists and Marxians is to show that neoclassicism depends on an unsound philosophy of 
science while Marxian economics does not. 
 How are Hollis and Nell able to establish that neoclassical economics is “backed by” a 
particular philosophy of science? Rather than demonstrating some kind of entailment 
relationship between a positivist philosophy of science and the neoclassical program, they appeal 
to the kinds of rhetoric that prominent neoclassicists wield. For example, they draw upon the 
following passage from economist Paul Samuelson to establish the connection between positivist 
principles and neoclassicism. Samuelson writes: 
All sciences have the common task of describing and summarizing reality. 
Economics is no exception. There are no separate methodological problems that 
face the social scientist different in kind from those that face any other 
scientist...Finally it is clear that no a priori empirical truths can exist in any field. 
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If a thing has a priori irrefutable truth, it must lack factual content. It must be 
regarded as a meaningless proposition in the technical sense of modern 
philosophy. (qtd. in Hollis and Nell 10) 
Hollis and Nell claim this passage implies that the neoclassical economic program is committed 
to a positivist philosophy of science. They draw out ten principles they claim constitutes this 
positivist philosophy of science which in turn serve as the basis for the neoclassical program (9-
10). Among these principles, the most important for their argument against neoclassical 
economics are (1) that all cognitively meaningful statements are either synthetic or analytic but 
not both, (2) that no synthetic statements can be known a priori, (3) that analytic statements have 
no factual content and (4) that the test of a theory is the success of its predictions. It follows from 
these statements that the only justifiable economic theories which contain factual content are 
constituted by synthetic a posteriori claims which are empirically testable. 
 After establishing the commitments which constitute the philosophy of science which 
backs neoclassical economists, Hollis and Nell go on to argue that this philosophy of science 
makes neoclassical economics untestable by its own standards. Their argument for this position 
is as follows: In order to be testable, an economic claim must specify a set of ceteris paribus 
clauses which exclude non-economic or otherwise irrelevant influences. However, in order to 
justify using a certain set of ceteris paribus clauses, we need some already existing theory which 
can attribute the interfering influences to some non-economic cause and thus establish that these 
influences can be controlled for. But, if we want to appeal to another theory in order to establish 
these ceteris paribus clauses, that theory will have to be a posteriori justified by its own 
empirical test. Thus, we will need an additional set of ceteris paribus clauses to test this theory, 
which of course will require appealing to another theory that justifies these ceteris paribus 
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clauses and so on. This process repeats infinitely if we remain committed to the principle that the 
only kind of knowledge we can have about the world is empirical. The only way to stop this 
regression, according to Hollis and Nell, would be to justify our claims, at the most fundamental 
level, in a priori truths. But, because neoclassicists’ positivist philosophy of economics denies 
the existence of synthetic a priori truths, and claims analytic truths are devoid of factual content, 
they are forbidden from making this move without violating their philosophy of economics. 
Thus, neoclassical economic theories are untestable as long as neoclassicists remain committed 
to a philosophy of economics which denies synthetic a priori truths. 
 Hollis and Nell are right in identifying a contradiction between a positivist philosophy of 
science and the neoclassical economic program. However, they have misunderstood the 
relationship that these two hold with one another. As Alexander Rosenberg points out in his 
criticism of Hollis and Nell, rather than showing that neoclassical economics is “backed by” 
positivist philosophy of science which is itself unsound, they have tried to show that positivism 
is unsound because it is incompatible with neoclassical economics. However, this undercuts their 
own starting premise that the neoclassical program is backed by a positivist philosophy of 
science (Rosenberg 24-27). Rosenberg suggests that Hollis and Nell have made this crucial 
mistake because they have been misled by the empty lip service that some prominent economists 
like Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson have played toward positivist rhetoric. However, I 
think there is a relationship between neoclassicism and positivism that goes deeper than just 
empty rhetoric which Hollis and Nell have uncovered with their analysis, despite their framing it 
incorrectly. 
 What Hollis and Nell mistake as the discovery of an internal contradiction in one 
economic program is actually a perfect demonstration of the difference between economic 
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programs and philosophies of economics. Recall that a philosophy of economics is constituted by 
the axiological, methodological, and factual commitments we explicitly claim to support, an 
economic program is constituted by the axiological, methodological, and factual commitments 
that the theories we endorse and practices we engage in actually commit us to. While it may be 
the case that the implicit principles we commit ourselves to when endorsing a set of economic 
theories perfectly aligns with the philosophy of economics we explicitly endorse, oftentimes the 
principles our theories and practices commit us to are not the same as the ones we explicitly 
endorse. What Hollis and Nell have uncovered in their analysis is that among neoclassical 
economists who endorse a positivist philosophy of science, the neoclassical economic program 
they endorse implicitly commits them to principles which are incompatible with the positivist 
philosophy of economics they explicitly endorse. Rather than uncovering a contradiction in the 
neoclassical program itself, Hollis and Nell have uncovered that neoclassical economists like 
Samuelson who endorse a positivist philosophy of economics are contradicting the economic 
program to which they are implicitly committed. 
 Once we are able to untangle what Hollis and Nell saw as one internally contradictory 
economic program into two distinct collections of claims—one an economic program and the 
other a philosophy of economics—Hollis and Nell’s conclusion that neoclassical economics is 
unjustified no longer follows. This is because there is no necessary connection between the 
neoclassical economic program and a positivist philosophy of economics, there is merely a 
contingent connection between the two which comes from the fact that prominent neoclassical 
economists like Samuelson endorse both of them. Because of their confusion of these two 
distinct sets of claims as making up one program, Hollis and Nell are led to a particularly absurd 
answer to the direction of justification problem: the contradiction between the neoclassical 
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economic program and the positivist philosophy of economics is used as evidence to reject both 
the economic program and the philosophy of economics.  
This can’t be right. Since the relationship between these two sets of principles are purely 
contingent and not necessary, we cannot reject them both on the grounds that they contradict one 
another. If we are to reject neoclassical economics as unsound based on the claim that it 
presupposes unsound epistemic principles, then we must do so by criticizing the principles that 
the neoclassical program actually commits itself to implicitly. But to do this, we must judge 
these principles against the principles that we think make up the correct philosophy of 
economics. If we are to make a comparative judgment between a positivist philosophy of 
economics and the neoclassical economic program, we are only justified in using the 
incompatibility of the two to either reject the neoclassical economic program on the grounds that 
it doesn’t align with the prescriptions of our positivist philosophy of economics, or reject the 
positivist philosophy of economics on the grounds that it doesn’t account for the successes of the 
neoclassical economic program. Thus, while we can progress beyond Hollis and Nell by 
realizing that the relationship between a positivist philosophy of economics and the neoclassical 
program are purely contingent, we are still left with the direction of justification problem; Hollis 
and Nell provide us no reason for why we ought to accept one and reject the other. 
 
3.2 Rosenberg 
 While Rosenberg understates the value Hollis and Nell bring to the discussion by their 
identifying (however imperfectly) the contradiction between prominent neoclassicists’ 
philosophy of economics and their economic program, he does reach the same conclusion about 
what Hollis and Nell are actually entitled to conclude. He writes, “The moral of the story should 
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be either (a) positivism is discredited as an account of the actual character of science...or (b) 
neoclassical economics is discredited as failing to satisfy positivist strictures” (27-28). While he 
doesn’t frame it in terms of the direction of justification problem, Rosenberg recognizes that the 
contradiction Hollis and Nell identify can’t disprove both positivism and neoclassicism. But, if 
we are only entitled to conclude one or the other, how do we determine which of the two to pick? 
 Rosenberg tries to answer this question along the same lines as Laudan’s coherentist 
response to the problem of determining how we get prescriptive power from a philosophical 
analysis of a scientific program. Rosenberg writes, “Different philosophies of science reconcile 
[scientific] goals, theories, and methods by, so to speak, holding one or two of these three 
variables constant and adjusting the others to suit” (13). Thus, like Laudan, Rosenberg does not 
think that we need to approach an analysis of a scientific program with an independent theory of 
science. Instead, we can choose which of the levels in the three parts of our scientific program 
we find plausible and hold this level fixed while we adjust the others to be consistent with our 
preferred assumptions. Just like Laudan, Rosenberg’s method does nothing to help us when 
confronted with two economic programs which disagree at every level, such as the neoclassical 
versus Marxian example discussed in part two, since there is no level of commitment which we 
can hold fixed as a shared standard for both programs.  
For his analysis, Rosenberg holds fixed the axiological principle that “a scientific 
discipline should be expected to show a long-term pattern of improvements in the proportion of 
correct predictions and their precision” (18). He then goes on to argue that we have good reason 
to believe economics has not improved in its predictive power over time and therefore does not 
live up to its own axiological commitment (56). As for why we are to hold this axiological 
principle fixed while adjusting the rest according to their ability to square with this principle, 
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Rosenberg offers a few independent reasons, which he admits will be largely unconvincing to 
someone already entrenched in an alternative axiology (19). His main reason for holding this 
principle fixed however, is that this is the axiological principle to which most economists 
themselves are committed (56). But here, Rosenberg seems to make the same mistake as Hollis 
and Nell. Hollis and Nell mistakenly took neoclassical economics to be internally contradictory 
because they believed economics was backed by a positivist philosophy of science that it could 
not live up to. But as we saw during our analysis of Hollis and Nell, they did not in fact identify 
an internal contradiction within economics, but merely showed that a positivist philosophy of 
economics was incompatible with the neoclassical economic program and thus the contingent 
connection between the two made by economists who endorsed positivism was unsound. 
Likewise, in holding the axiological commitment of predictive power fixed because economists 
endorse it, Rosenberg is not actually showing that neoclassical economics does not live up to its 
own principles, but is instead showing that economists who endorse improvement in predictive 
power as an axiological commitment of their philosophy of economics are not acting in a way 
which is consistent with the economic program they endorse .  
Thus, Rosenberg, like Hollis and Nell, is discovering a contradiction between a 
philosophy of economics which is typically endorsed by neoclassical economists and the implicit 
principles which make up the neoclassical economic program. Unlike Hollis and Nell, Rosenberg 
does not make the mistake of thinking that this contradiction proves both the economic program 
and the philosophy of economics wrong. But, like Hollis and Nell, Rosenberg takes a stance on 
what this contradiction entails without good reason. Rosenberg decides to endorse the 
philosophy of economics which holds improvement in predictive power as its key axiological 
commitment and rejects neoclassical economics for failing to live up to this standard. Thus, he 
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chooses a direction of justification which starts with a philosophy of economics and judges 
economic programs according to this standard. But the other possibility is still open. Why ought 
we not instead conclude that Rosenberg’s (and many economists’) philosophy of economics is 
flawed because it fails to square with our economic programs? 
It may be that this alternative position which uses economic programs as a standard to 
judge philosophies of economics is widely considered unacceptable, as was the case with the 
example from part two where we considered whether we ought to reject all of science in order to 
preserve our commitment to falsificationism. If this is the case, then we would have good reason 
to side with Rosenberg and not consider the direction of justification problem to be a live 
problem. However, this is not the case. Other notable philosophers of science, such as D. Wade 




 Hands finds himself confronted with the same problem as Rosenberg, as well as Hollis 
and Nell, but offers yet a third intuition about how this problem is to be solved. In his paper 
“Second thoughts on Lakatos” (1985), Hands assesses the applicability of a Lakatosian 
philosophy of economics to the neoclassical economic program. Lakatos’s methodology of 
scientific research programs (MSRP) aims to assess the degree to which a scientific research 
program is progressing over time. To clear up some potential terminological confusion, 
according to the distinctions I made in section one, Lakatos’ MSRP falls under the category of a 
theory of science (or philosophy of economics when applied to economics). This is because, 
according to the three-part model, methodological commitments tell us how a science is to 
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achieve the goals expressed by the axiological commitments but do not tell us the goals 
themselves. The MSRP tells us what a scientific program ought to achieve and which 
methodologies best achieve this, meaning that it expresses not only methodological but also 
axiological commitments. Therefore, despite Hands referring to the MSRP as a methodology, I 
will be referring to it as either a theory of science or a philosophy of economics. 
 Hands aims to assess the MSRP by seeing if it can explain why our most successful 
economic programs are successful. While the MSRP aims to be a prescriptive theory of science 
that is able to assess the relative merits of competing scientific programs, it is itself tested by 
whether it is able to explain why our most successful scientific programs are successful. As for 
how this is applied to economics, Hands writes: 
If we are to follow this metamethodology in appraising the MSRP as a 
methodology of economic science, it appears that we should proceed by 
examining the best gambits of economics through Lakatosian spectacles. If the 
acknowledged best economic theories appear rational in light of the MSRP—that 
is, if the profession’s acceptance of these theories can be explained internally by 
the standards set forth in the MSRP—then Lakatos’ methodology should be given 
positive marks with respect to economic science. (Testing, Rationality, and 
Progress 40-41) 
Thus, Hands presupposes the exact opposite answer to the direction of justification problem as 
Rosenberg at the very beginning of his analysis. According to Hands, a philosophy of economics 
should be assessed based on how well it coincides with our most successful economic programs. 
If our philosophy of economics contradicts our most highly endorsed economic programs, then 
this gives us reason to reject our philosophy of economics as inadequate. 
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 According to the MSRP, the standard according to which a scientific program ought to be 
judged as successful or unsuccessful is based on whether it is progressing or degenerating over 
time. A scientific program is progressing over time if and only if its successive theories are able 
to explain or predict novel facts which its predecessors could not (“Testing, Rationality, and 
Progress 42). Using this standard, Hands assesses what he believes are the two “best gambits” in 
economics: the Keynesian program and the neo-Walrasian program. In both cases, Hands 
concludes that these two programs have not progressed according to the MSRP and are thus 
unsuccessful programs according to a Lakatosian philosophy of economics. For the Keynesian 
program, Hands writes, “There can be little doubt that Keynesian economics is a best gambit in 
economics if anything is … few, if any, economists would doubt its progressiveness in the 
1930s” (Testing, Rationality, and Progress 46). Nevertheless, by the strict standards of the 
MSRP, it had even less empirical content than its predecessors and as such was degenerative 
(Testing, Rationality, and Progress 46). Hands concludes that the MSRP’s inability to explain 
the Keynesian program’s clear successes must count against the plausibility of the MSRP 
(Testing, Rationality, and Progress 46). He goes on to make the same claim about the neo-
Walrasian program. 
 Rather than suggesting we change the way we do economics so as to meet the standards 
set out by the Lakatosian philosophy of economics, Hands concludes his paper by suggesting 
ways that we can change our philosophy of economics so that it better explains the successes of 
our best economic programs. Specifically, Hands argues that our philosophy of economics must 
create room for explaining the progress of an economic program purely in terms of its theoretical 
rather than empirical advancements if our philosophy of economics is going to explain why the 
neo-Walrasian program has been so successful (Testing, Rationality, and Progress 48). Hands 
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thus identifies the same contradiction as Rosenberg: a philosophy of economics which stipulates 
that improvement in empirical power over time is a necessary condition for a successful 
economic program is inconsistent with the reality of our best neoclassical economic programs. 
Nevertheless, Hands draws from this same observation the opposite conclusion: rather than 
rejecting our best economic programs on the grounds that they do not live up to the standards set 
by our philosophy of economics, as Rosenberg does, we ought to reject any philosophy of 
economics which can’t explain our best economic programs as successful. 
 
3.4 The Common Theme 
 All three of the works addressed in section 3 diverge from one another on their 
prescriptions about economics, despite the fact that all three works identify the same phenomena: 
a contradiction between the philosophy of economics to which neoclassical economists often 
subscribe and the economic programs to which those economists subscribe. Yet, all three works 
draw different conclusions; Hollis and Nell conclude that the solution is to reject both the 
philosophy of economics and the economic program, Rosenberg concludes that we ought to 
maintain the philosophy of economics and reject the economic program, and Hands concludes 
that we ought to maintain the economic program and reject the philosophy of economics. If 
philosophers of economics hope to obtain some amount of prescriptive power over economics, 
then we must settle on a principled answer to the direction of justification problem. Otherwise, 
whenever a philosopher of economics astutely makes the observation that a philosophy of 
economics contradicts an economic program, we will have no principled way of determining 




4. Moving Towards an Answer to the Direction of Justification Problem 
 In part four, I survey two possible answers to the direction of justification problem, one 
from Larry Laudan and the other from Bruce Caldwell, and show that they are both insufficient 
answers, at least within the domain of economics. However, I argue that both proposed answers 
provide us with valuable insights into what a sufficient answer to the direction of justification 
problem would have to look like. Based on these insights, I try to create an image of what an 
answer to the direction of justification problem will have to look like. While I do not aim to 
provide an answer to the problem, I hope to show that these insights provide a valuable 
framework for future research in the philosophy of economics for those who recognize the need 
to develop a response to the direction of justification problem. 
 
4.1 Using Laudan’s Insights to Help Solve the Direction of Justification Problem 
 In attempting to develop his own comprehensive theory of science, Laudan anticipates 
the potential for a problem like the direction of justification problem to be levied toward 
philosophers of science. He only briefly considers this potential as part of a much larger work 
and frames it specifically as a way of addressing the relationship the philosophy of science 
should have with the history of science. Nevertheless, he presents a valuable, if incomplete, 
insight into how we can solve the direction of justification problem in economics. In this section, 
I will first explain Laudan’s position and how it could be applied to the direction of justification 
problem in economics. I argue that his answer on its own, while perhaps sufficient for the natural 
sciences, is not applicable to economics. Then, I draw on some elements of Laudan’s position to 
begin articulating what a sufficient answer to the direction of justification problem will need. 
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 In Progress and Its Problems (1977) Laudan expresses similar concerns to the direction 
of justification problem in the general philosophy of science. He acknowledges that despite our 
desire to build a purely a priori theory of science, there will inevitably be some cases in which 
our theory of science coming into contradiction with the realities of scientific practice should 
serve as evidence against our theory of science rather than as an indictment of science itself. 
Most notably, he writes that if a theory of science “entailed that the whole of the history of 
science was irrational, we would tend to view that as a reductio ad absurdum of the theory of 
[scientific] rationality rather than as a demonstration that science itself had been a sequence of 
entirely irrational preferences,” (Progress and Its Problems 157). Laudan recognizes that if in 
some cases our theory of science allows us to make negative appraisals about scientific programs 
when they contradict the prescriptions of our theory of science, but in other cases this 
contradiction should count against our theory of science rather than as an indictment of science, 
then there must be “mutual dependence between history of science and philosophy of science,” 
(Progress and Its Problems 157). 
 If we are to admit to this mutual dependence, how are we to do so without falling into a 
viciously circular position? Laudan is concerned that if we allow the history and philosophy of 
science to be dependent upon one another without clearly determining which of the two is more 
fundamental in our hierarchy of justification, then we risk begging the question. He writes: 
If the writing of history of science presupposes a philosophy of science and if a 
philosophy of science is then to be authenticated by its capacity to lay bare the 
rationality held to be implicit in the history of science, how can we avoid 
automatic self-authentication, since the history we write will presuppose the very 
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philosophy which the written history will allegedly test? (Progress and Its 
Problems 157) 
Here, Laudan is expressing a concern which parallels that of the direction of justification 
problem. If the philosophy of science is authenticated by its ability to square with the history of 
science, but our writing of the history of science presupposes a philosophy of science which tells 
us which moments in the history of science were scientifically justified, then we’ve caught 
ourselves in a vicious circle. Likewise, as in the direction of justification problem, if our 
philosophy of economics is evaluated by its ability to explain why we think certain economic 
programs are successful, but we also use our philosophy of economics as the standard against 
which we determine whether an economic program is successful, we’ve caught ourselves in a 
circle much like the one Laudan is concerned about. Both of these problems require that we have 
some way of determining in which cases science as it exists (or once existed) in practice ought to 
be evaluated against our philosophical commitments, and in which cases our philosophical 
commitments ought to be evaluated against science as it exists in practice. 
Laudan’s solution for preventing a descent into circularity is to appeal to our 
“prephilosophical hunches about which theories are rational and which are not,” (Progress and 
Its Problems 159). Laudan argues that to avoid circularity, we must hold a handful of moments 
in the history of science in place as intuitively rational, such that any “scientifically educated” 
person would have to endorse them as examples of good science (Progress and Its Problems 
159-160). Once we have collected a small set of moments in the history of science that we 
“prephilosophically” suppose must be rational—Laudan refers to these beliefs as our “preferred 
pre-analytic intuitions about scientific rationality”—we can use these cases as a standard upon 
which we can judge the strength of any theory of science (Progress and Its Problems 161-162). 
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Thus, any theory of science must be judged on its ability to explain the set of moments in the 
history of science captured by our pre-analytic intuitions about scientific rationality, and any 
indictments the theory has on the history of science beyond this should be considered a 
shortcoming of the sciences and not of our theory of science (Progress and Its Problems 162). 
Laudan therefore gives us the following answer to the direction of justification problem in 
science in general: we must use our intuitions about science to determine, in advance of coming 
across a contradiction between a scientific program and a theory of science, which will serve as 
the more foundational commitment that should be maintained at the expense of the other. If the 
scientific program in question is one which is captured by our intuitions, then its being in 
contradiction with our theory of science is evidence against our theory of science. In all other 
cases, the contradiction between a scientific program and a theory of science is evidence against 
the scientific program. 
Provided we can agree upon a set of moments in the history of science we will hold as 
intuitive, Laudan’s solution seems to offer us a formula which provides us an answer to the 
direction of justification problem in every case. Of course, Laudan’s proposed solution is only 
useful to us if it is actually possible for us to identify a shared set of pre-analytic intuitions. 
While Laudan does not claim to have identified what claims make up this set of intuitions, he 
does provide some examples to illustrate what this set of claims would look like. For example, 
one of our intuitions might be that “it was rational to accept Newtonian mechanics and to reject 
Aristotelian mechanics by, say, 1800” (Progress and Its Problems 160). Notably, all of the 
intuitions he appeals to are exclusive to the natural sciences. He offers us no examples of 
intuitions from the history of economics or any other social science. This could imply that either 
(1) Laudan is not considering the potential for the direction of justification problem to arise in 
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the social sciences or (2) Laudan thinks the social sciences should be held to the same standard 
as whatever view we settle on to evaluate the natural sciences. 
Both of these answers are insufficient for our purposes; the first because it does not 
answer our questions about the direction of justification problem in economics, and the second 
because it leaves too much on the table. If we commit ourselves to the second claim, that 
economics ought to be evaluated according to whatever theory of science we use to evaluate the 
natural sciences, we push some of the most interesting philosophical debates in economics aside 
and risk begging the question. In many of the disputes about what philosophy of economics we 
ought to commit ourselves to, the question of whether economics should be held to the same 
standards as the natural sciences is itself part of the dispute. For example, Austrian economists 
are often distinguished from their neoclassical counterparts by their commitment to a dualistic 
view according to which the correct theory of natural science is not the same as the correct 
theory of social science. Austrian economists explicitly hold as part of their philosophy of 
economics at the level of axiological commitment that the social sciences are fundamentally 
aiming at producing different kinds of knowledge than the natural sciences are trying to produce. 
If acceptance of Laudan’s view requires that we presuppose that economics can be evaluated by 
the same theory of science as the natural sciences, then his framework requires us to presuppose 
too much that is up for debate. 
Thus, it is unlikely that using the intuitions from the natural sciences that Laudan 
provides for us will be sufficient for our purposes in economics. However, the strategy he uses is 
a valuable one and worth emulating in the philosophy of economics. In establishing a small set 
of intuitions from the history of science, Laudan is trying to make the least amount of 
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assumptions necessary for creating a prescriptive philosophy of science. Laudan is well aware of 
the costs of the assumptions he’s making, writing: 
We should be very explicit about what we are committing ourselves to in taking 
this approach: (1) that at least certain specified developments in the history of 
science were rational; and (2) that the test of any putative model of rational 
[theory] choice is whether it can explicate the rationality assumed to be inherent 
in these developments. Claim (1), modest though it is, remains entirely a matter of 
faith since there is, in principle, no way we could prove these cases were rational, 
for our criterion of rationality itself will take their rationality for granted. 
(Progress and Its Problems 161) 
Laudan is very clear about the costs of his approach here: his method of appealing to pre-analytic 
intuitions requires that we take on faith that there have been at least some moments in the history 
of science which were rational. By rational, he means that we had good epistemic reasons for 
accepting this development as a progression in science. Thus, we might rewrite his assumption as 
(1) that at least certain specified developments in the history of science were for good epistemic 
reasons.  
The goal of Laudan’s strategy of appealing to pre-analytic intuitions is to allow for the 
development of a prescriptive theory of science while starting with a set of assumptions that are 
as modest as possible, such that any scientifically educated person would reasonably agree to 
them as starting principles. I think this is a valuable strategy that we might hope to emulate in the 
philosophy of economics. A Laudanian approach to establishing a strategy for developing a 
prescriptive philosophy of economics might look as follows: first, we identify a set of intuitions 
about economics, or perhaps the social sciences in general, based on the most modest set of 
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assumptions possible. Once we have established this set of intuitions, we can then judge our 
philosophy of economics by how consistent it is with the assumption that our selected intuitions 
are indeed true. In all other cases, when we apply our philosophy of economics to economic 
programs and find the two to be in contradiction, we must conclude that this counts as evidence 
against the economic program in question and not against our philosophy of economics. 
What are we to use as our set of intuitions for economics? I am not sure. But I think we 
can make some assertions about what this set of intuitions would have to be like. A set of 
intuitions will have to (1) be robust enough for us to use them as a standard against any proposed 
philosophy of economics and (2) be as modest as possible while still achieving the goal of (1). 
Furthermore, I think the best way to measure the modesty of our assumption is based on how 
well our assumption minimizes the number of reasonable people with informed beliefs about 
economics whose positions are excluded. An assumption analogous to Laudan’s but applied to 
economics, (1’) that at least certain specified developments in the history of economics were for 
good epistemic reasons, does not seem modest enough for economics. This is because prominent 
skeptical philosophers of economics like Rosenberg who are prepared to reject all of the progress 
of economics thus far would be locked out of the philosophy of economics on this assumption. I 
am not sure what a better assumption would be, but it would have to be one which didn’t exclude 
prominent philosophers of economics like Rosenberg on faith alone. A potential alternative 
assumption could be as follows: (1’’) that at least certain specified developments in the history 
of economics were such that reasonable, educated thinkers thought these developments were for 
good epistemic reasons. This assumption essentially requires us to assume something even more 
modest than the assumption that economics has progressed: that economists are smart, and that 
because of this, any philosophy of economics should at least be able to explain why smart 
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economists saw progress even if there in fact was none. I think Rosenberg would agree to this 
more modest principle, but I am not sure if it is robust enough to use as a standard for developing 
a philosophy of economics. I hope that philosophers and economists who read this may be able 
to think of a better assumption, or find a way to build a robust philosophy of economics 
according to the assumption I’ve provided. 
 I have tried to lay out what the first step to solving the direction of justification problem 
will have to look like. It must begin by evaluating our philosophy of economics according to a 
set of intuitions which are developed from the most modest set of assumptions possible, where 
modesty is measured by the ability to minimize the number of reasonable agents educated in 
economics who reject the assumption. This first step only gets us part of the way there, however. 
I argued in part three that a fatal mistake many philosophers of economics make is to judge an 
economic program based on the explicitly stated philosophy of economics of that program’s 
members. Instead, we ought to judge economic programs based on their own implicit 
commitments and not the explicit commitments of their members. But how do we determine 
what these implicit commitments are if we can’t simply ask the members of the economic 
program in question? In the next section, I will try to answer this question. 
 
4.2 Using Caldwell’s Insights to Help Solve the Direction of Justification Problem 
 Bruce Caldwell offers a strategy for assessing competing economic programs he calls 
methodological pluralism. Methodological pluralism asserts that the best way to criticize 
economic programs is on their own terms. According to Caldwell, methodological pluralism 
“takes as a starting assumption that no universally applicable, logically compelling method of 
theory appraisal exists. (Or, more correctly, even if it exists, we can never be sure that we have 
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found it, even if we have.)” (Beyond Positivism 245). Rather than analyze economic programs 
according to the degree to which they align with our philosophy of economics, we are to try our 
hardest to criticize economic programs according to their own principles. Caldwell writes, “Such 
[economic] programs should be criticized either on their own terms, or for failing to show how 
they can be compared to other programs,” (Beyond Positivism 248). But, what exactly does it 
mean to criticize an economic program on its own terms? It’s not made extremely clear by 
Caldwell, but there are some important clues he leaves for us.  
Caldwell claims that the pluralist approach is most useful “when the methodologies of 
opposing camps are founded on rival epistemological systems,” (Beyond Positivism 248). The 
idea here is a valuable one, but it is an ambiguous one. Caldwell rightly wants to avoid the 
tendency for economists with rival axiological views to reject alternative economic programs 
simply because they presuppose their own axiology to be correct. For example, he cites the 
frustrating tendency for neoclassical economists to reject the Austrian program on the grounds 
that Austrian theories cannot be subject to an empirical test, which is to presuppose the 
neoclassical economist’s axiological commitment to testability (Beyond Positivism 249-250). 
However, despite correctly rejecting the approach which presupposes one’s own axiology, he 
leaves us with a fairly vague idea for his alternative. Caldwell suffers from the same problem as 
Hollis and Nell when he uses the ambiguous relation of an economic program being “founded 
on” an epistemological system. Without a clearer understanding of what this relation is, we 
might worry that Caldwell’s “founded on” relation is just as contingent as Hollis and Nell’s 
“backed by” relation between neoclassical economics and positivism, where this “backing” 
relation turned out to be no more than the contingent connection formed by neoclassical 
economists who have tended to endorse a positivist philosophy of economics. If Caldwell’s idea 
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of a “founding” relation is like this, then Caldwell’s position would collapse into Hollis and 
Nell’s position. Thus, I propose two possible ways of interpreting what Caldwell means here. 
Under the first interpretation, I will argue, Caldwell’s view collapses into the same untenable 
position as Hollis and Nell’s view. However, under the second interpretation, Caldwell provides 
us with a promising component to a solution for the direction of justification problem. 
 One way we could go about criticizing an economic program “on its own terms” is to 
criticize the theories produced by an economic program according to whether they live up to the 
explicit philosophy of economics that economists in that program endorse. So, if most 
neoclassicists endorse positivism as Hollis and Nell suggest, we criticize theories produced in the 
neoclassical tradition based on whether they are consistent with the prescriptions of positivism. 
This interpretation would leave Caldwell guilty of the same misunderstandings as Hollis and 
Nell’s position. Since the relationship between an economist’s philosophy of economics and that 
economist’s economic program is a purely contingent one (it is not necessarily the case that the 
axiological, methodological, and factual commitments that economists explicitly endorse are the 
commitments which she implicitly commits to when engaging in her research) we have not 
demonstrated anything about whether the economic programs under scrutiny themselves have 
merit. We’ve only shown that these programs are or aren’t consistent with the philosophy of 
economics those economists tend to endorse. It might be interesting to us whether the economists 
we are criticizing are being consistent between their explicit and implicit commitments, but this 
fact is irrelevant to whether the programs under scrutiny are themselves worthwhile. Since 
Caldwell elsewhere cites his criticism of Austrian economics as an example of the kind of 
internal criticism he is promoting, (“The Case for Pluralism” 240), and this criticism of Austrian 
economics is based in whether Austrian’s theories live up to their own explicit endorsement of 
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praxeology, this first interpretation is probably what Caldwell has in mind.14 And I should note 
that for Caldwell’s purposes this may be perfectly adequate. Caldwell himself is a pragmatist to a 
tee, and so the question of whether an economic theory is true or justified is secondary to his 
interests (“The Case for Pluralism” 241-243). But, for those of us who are interested in what 
kinds of epistemic attitudes we should take toward economic programs, this won’t do. 
 I propose an alternative interpretation of what it means to criticize an economic program 
“on its own terms” which I will argue is much more relevant to the epistemic merit of economic 
programs. Instead of criticizing an economic program according to the philosophy of economics 
explicitly promoted by members of that program, we should criticize economic programs 
according to the best possible set of axiological, methodological, and factual commitments we 
could construct that, if true, would make the economic program we are scrutinizing justified. Let 
me explicate this position a bit more to show why it better fits with the understanding of 
economic programs I have presented in this paper. Recall that what distinguishes philosophies of 
economics from economic programs is that a philosophy of economics is constituted by the 
axiological, methodological, and factual commitments we explicitly endorse, whereas an 
economic program is made up of the commitments that the theories we support and the practices 
we engage in actually commit us to. For example, we can imagine an economist who claims to 
be a strict falsificationist, but nevertheless she supports economic theories which are 
unfalsifiable or when doing research does not actually adhere to the practice of rejecting a theory 
as soon as it is falsified. If we criticize this economist because her theories don’t live up to the 
falsificationist standards to which she supposedly endorses, we may have learned something 
interesting about this economist, but we’ve learned nothing about whether the theories and 
 
14 See Beyond Positivism (1982) pp. 128-135 for Caldwell’s criticism of Austrian economics. 
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practices she supports are themselves justified. What matters to the merit of an economic 
program is not the explicit principles which the economist endorses, but the implicit ones which 
come from her practices. 
 Unfortunately, it is no simple endeavour to figure out what principles an economist is 
implicitly committing herself to when she supports a theory or a certain way of doing economics. 
Caldwell himself is aware of this difficulty, writing: 
It is perhaps appropriate to note at this point that figuring out what economists are 
up to is not particularly easy. One can learn how to do economics, of course, by 
simply training to be an economist. But as Thomas Kuhn points out, this process 
is anything but a self-conscious one. It occurs through a sort of mental osmosis as 
one learns the paradigmatic solutions to various well-established normal science 
puzzles. (Beyond Positivism 232) 
The difficulty of figuring out exactly what implicit principles make up an economic program is 
further complicated by the fact that our answer will likely be underdetermined. For any 
collection of theories or practices in economics, there will likely be many possible collections of 
principles which could serve as the implicit commitments of the economists who engage in these 
practices and produce these theories. Therefore, I suggest that if we are to approach an economic 
program on its own terms, we ought to judge the theory according to the most plausible set of 
commitments that, if true, would be sufficient for the economic program in question to be 
justified. We then choose to endorse or reject the program in question based on whether this most 
charitable reconstruction is possible for us to accept. 
 The way this process could work is as follows. Suppose we observe a group of 
economists who all seem to be more or less working within the same program. They tend to 
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endorse the same theories, perform the same practices when doing research, and typically come 
to the same conclusions when considering the merits of newly proposed theories. This group of 
economists is practicing within an economic program, but because their commitments are 
implicit, we cannot simply ask them about their commitments. To ask these economists about the 
principles they endorse would be to ask them about their philosophy of economics but not their 
economic program. Thus, we must ourselves reconstruct what underlying principles the 
economists in question are committing themselves to. But we could likely posit multiple 
different accounts of this economic program which would be consistent with the actions of the 
economists in question. In this case, we ought to construct an account of this economic program 
in question which is constituted by the principles that are as plausible to us as possible which 
would justify the theories and practices of the economists in question if they were true. Then, we 
can judge the economic program in question according to whether this best possible 
reconstruction of the axiological, methodological, and factual commitments in question 
constitutes a set of commitments we are comfortable endorsing. 
 
4.3 Proposing a Framework for Solving the Direction of Justification Problem 
 Neither Laudan nor Caldwell on their own solve the direction of justification problem. 
However, when we combine the strategies proposed by Laudan and Caldwell, we can create a 
framework for a robust methodology. Using the insights of Laudan and Caldwell I will now 
formulate a method for answering the direction of justification problem using a hypothetical 
example. 
Suppose we take neoclassical economics as an economic program we are interested in 
criticizing using the tools of philosophy. This is how we could do so while answering the 
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direction of justification problem: first, we must come to the table with a philosophy of 
economics. We develop this philosophy of economics according to its ability to square with the 
set of intuitions we have decided to hold fixed. The intuitions we choose to hold fixed will be 
based on whatever intuitions require the most modest assumptions while also being robust 
enough to serve as an evaluative standard for our philosophy of economics. Once we have 
explicated a philosophy of economics by determining which set of principles best square with 
our intuitions, we now have the tools to evaluate the neoclassical economic program. To perform 
this analysis, we must analyze the practices neoclassical economists are engaging in and the 
theories they endorse so that we may propose a set of axiological, methodological, and factual 
commitments which are as plausible to us as possible while being sufficient for justifying the 
neoclassical program if the commitments were true. Then, we determine whether this most 
charitable reconstruction of the neoclassical program is consistent with our philosophy of 
economics we have developed from our intuitions. If the reconstructed neoclassical program is 
consistent with our philosophy of economics, we accept the neoclassical program as an example 
of good economics. If the reconstructed version of the neoclassical program is inconsistent with 
our philosophy of economics, we reject the neoclassical program as bad economics pending 
future changes in the neoclassical program which would warrant a reevaluation. 
A full solution to the direction of justification problem will require that we fill out each 
step along the way; we must establish a set of intuitions, develop a philosophy of economics 
according to these intuitions, reconstruct the economic program in question as charitably as 
possible, and finally determine whether our philosophy of economics is consistent with this 
program. While I have not filled out these steps by providing what I think to be the best set of 
intuitions, the best philosophy of economics, and the best reconstruction of the neoclassical 
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program, I nevertheless hope that this strategy I’ve proposed will allow us to make these next 
steps and develop a prescriptive philosophy of economics. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have tried to establish two major claims about the philosophy of 
economics. First, that the tools from the philosophy of science, like the three-part model, are 
worth applying to economics if only for the explanatory role they can play in untangling 
disagreements between economic schools of thought whose divergence arises from differences in 
underlying principles that economists may not even be aware of. I have tried to defend this 
position by drawing from numerous examples in economics, including demonstrating an exercise 
in analyzing a divergence between neoclassical and Marxian economics. The second claim I 
have tried to establish in this paper is that the ability for philosophers to weigh in on these 
disputes between competing economic programs is currently blocked by a hitherto unrecognized 
problem: our inability to know when our philosophy of economics ought to influence economic 
programs and when economic programs ought to influence our philosophy of economics, which I 
have called the direction of justification problem. Finally, I have tried to argue for what a 
solution to the direction of justification problem would have to look like.  
My intent is not to suggest that we should abandon the pursuit of using philosophy to 
settle some of these disagreements in economics. On the contrary, I have tried to demonstrate 
that the fit between the tools of philosophy of science and economics make this avenue worth 
pursuing. However, if we are to pursue it, I urge that philosophers of economics recognize this 
problem which has currently gone unrecognized in the philosophy of economics, and understand 
the importance that a principled solution to the direction of justification problem will have if the 
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philosophy of economics is to achieve its pursuit of prescriptive power. I hope that the strategy I 
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